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Behind the Headline: Water, Water Everywhere…
January 5, 2010 in China Behind the Headline by The China Beat | 3 comments

In mid-December, Financial Times published a piece about China’s south-north water diversion
project. Writer Jamil Anderlini begins the article with a brief description of the project:
“[The government] told us they were moving us to new lands to become rich and prosperous but
they’ve thrown us into a fire pit,” sobs Ms Li. “The new land and houses are worthless and our lives
there are so bitter.”
The peasant farmer is among the first batch of 440,000 people who will be uprooted to make way for
the reservoir and a canal that will carry water from the Yangtze river and its tributaries in the south of
China to the arid northern plains and Beijing.
This project, with its echoes of Maoist megalomania, does not fit easily with modern China,
where Beijing is making concerted efforts to clean up its tormented environment and foster its own
green revolution.
Ken Pomeranz, who has been studying and writing about China’s water control and conservation
efforts, wrote the following response to the article.
By Ken Pomeranz
The Financial Times article points to very real problems with the south-north water diversion scheme –
and there are others besides. But at the same time, the article is quite one-sided (one would never
know, for instance, that Chinese water use in agriculture has already declined close to 20 percent
since the 1980s, while production has increased a bit), and it misses the reasons why people who are
by no means crazy might think this is an idea worth trying. (I have written on issues related to this
project – especially the Western leg of the plan, which is its most ambitious and controversial part – at
much greater length elsewhere: an easily accessed version is “The Great Himalayan Watershed: Water
Shortages, Mega-Projects and Environmental Politics in China, India, and Southeast Asia” in Asia
Pacific Journal: Japan Focus, July 27, 2009.)
On the negative side, it is not at all clear that the Yangzi basin can actually spare the 47 billion gallons
per year that would be diverted under the complete version of the plan – particularly since climate
change is likely to drastically shrink the Himalayan glaciers that are one important source for the
Yangzi. And if the plan decreases the rate of flow in the river, and in some of its principal tributaries –
the Han River is a particular point of concern — it will decrease those rivers’ capacity to flush out their
pollutants. And the problems of displacing people are certainly real enough.
Moreover, technically speaking, the project is almost certainly inefficient. Its estimated price tag is
$65 billion (though less if the Western leg never gets built, as some people, not including me, predict).
If you put that much money into fixing leaky faucets, lining irrigation ditches, and improving basic
waste-water treatment (allowing more water to be re-used), you would almost certainly do more to
relieve pressure on North China’s water supply than the diversion will do. But there are serious
obstacles to these solutions. It is not at all clear that Beijing has the capacity to monitor the
implementation of such a low-tech, decentralized solution – in other words, to make sure millions of
faucets and pipes and so forth get fixed, and, more importantly, stay fixed. If you wanted to make
sure that water conservation became and remained a priority in the countryside – which is where
something on the order of 80 percent of water use (and an even higher percentage of water waste)
occurs, you would need to raise prices dramatically – one recent study (by Scott Rozelle et.al.)
suggest that a price hike of 150 percent would be needed to even make a dent in the problem. (You
would also need to build a lot of infrastructure – among other things, in much of rural North China,
water meters simply don’t exist)
What would such a price hike mean? Almost certainly, a significant reduction in North and Northwest
China’s agricultural production – beginning with the winter wheat crop, which is almost entirely
dependent on irrigation, and with cotton production. This would mean significantly greater agricultural

imports – which China could certainly afford, from a foreign exchange perspective, but which makes
officials nervous, both for geo-strategic reasons and because the responses of other countries to
possible global food price increases are unpredictable. But probably even more important than these
factors would be the social effects. For millions of farmers whose incomes already lag far behind those
of urbanites, and whose profit margins are often very thin, more expensive water might well push
them off the land and towards the cities –at least seasonally (the end of winter wheat production
would mean very high seasonal unemployment) and in many cases permanently. Given the already
daunting challenges posed by very rapid urbanization in China, it is not at all clear that one would
want to make the process even more rapid. Nor is it clear that one wants to make those who would
stay behind in the North China countryside even poorer, as this would certainly do.
So while the water diversion scheme carries enormous risks, and is certainly very far from the optimal
solution, it may, by default, become a bad idea whose time has come. It’s not, I think, that people in
the government don’t realize that controlling demand (and pollution) may be more promising than
increasing supply, or that they aren’t trying to do those things, or that those who support the water
diversion scheme are indulging in nostalgia for Maoist gigantism. The real point is that its not at all
clear that efficiency gains can be realized fast enough to keep North China, which has about 6 percent
of the global average per capita water supply, from facing a devastating water crunch – especially if
its people are to see their living standards improve. (Remember, for instance, that even a small
increase in the amount of meat people consume increases water demand very sharply.) The project
may well be too much of an environmental gamble to undertake, at least in its full-blown form; I lean
towards that position myself. But it is a response to very real dilemmas: when the Financial
Times article calls it a “pharoanic gesture,” and treats it simply as an anachronistic and brutal act of a
government completely heedless of its people, it distorts a much more complicated reality.

